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(Hallett, 2007). None of the studies conducted so far provide tools 
for answering the question whether or not free will (in philo-
sophical terms) exists: this is still unproven and perhaps unprov-
able (Baumeister, 2008). Rather, they illuminate the relationship 
between brain mechanisms involved in our subjective experience 
of what appear as conscious and voluntary decisions or intentions 
to act (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Haynes et al., 
2007; Soon et al., 2008).
The fi rst attempt of a scientifi c investigation into the sense 
of volition has been done by Libet et al. (1983), who conducted 
pioneering studies on consciousness and intentional acts. In a 
typical Libet’s experiment, subjects sat in front of a clock with 
a rapidly moving spot and they were asked to move their index 
fi nger or their wrist at will. Subsequently, they were asked to report 
what time it was (i.e. where the spot was) when they had the fi rst 
subjective experience of intending to act. This reported time is 
called the will judgment (W). At the same time, Libet et al. (1983) 
recorded the electrical brain activity and movement-related corti-
cal potentials were assessed to determine the timing of activity of 
the brain. The critical fi nding was that individuals’ voluntary acts 
were preceded by a slow negative-going potential named readi-
ness potential (RP), that begins 500 ms to about 1,000 ms before 
the action. The reported W was approximately 200 ms before the 
response. Thus, the neural preparation for the action began about 
300–800 ms before the person consciously made the decision to act. 
INTRODUCTION
In our daily lives, we have the impression that we are able to choose 
freely and consciously among different possible courses of actions. 
Constantly we have the impression that our behavior is guided, at 
least in many circumstances, by our conscious decisions, which 
are a sort of ‘driving force’ of our behavior. In large part, that’s 
presumably because we feel that our conscious decision to act 
precedes the action itself. For example, when we decide to turn 
on the TV, we feel clearly that the action of actually turning on 
the TV is preceded (and caused) by our conscious intention to 
turn on the TV. Given that the cause always precedes the effect, 
we feel that our conscious decision caused the TV to be turned 
on. However, recent fi ndings in psychology and neuroscience have 
shown that the relationship between conscious intentions behavior 
is rather more complex.
The question of whether our actions are caused by conscious 
intentions is intertwined with the question of free will, which has 
been traditionally conducted only in philosophical and speculative 
terms. In the last decades, however, the problem of free will has 
become a neurophysiological one and a great number of studies 
have attempted a scientifi c investigation of cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying free will. In order to avoid any confusion 
about what we intend here by the term ‘free will’, it must be said 
that when neuroscientists argue about free will, they actually mean 
the ‘feeling of having a free will’, or the ‘perception of  volition’ 
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The authors concluded that conscious will would thus seem to be 
a latecomer in the process of choice, rather than the instigator of 
choice (Libet et al., 1983).
These results contrast our constant feeling of being fully respon-
sible of our actions. Indeed, we feel, at least in a vast number of cir-
cumstances, that we have full and conscious access to our intentions 
and action plans. However, the main results have been confi rmed 
repeatedly (e.g. Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Soon et al., 2008) and 
there is now experimental evidence suggesting that the sense of voli-
tion is not a driving force in the initiation of our behavior. Rather, 
it seems that the subjective experience of free will is a construction, 
derived from the brain’s motor system producing a movement and 
somehow ‘informing’ consciousness of the movement, with the 
effect that we feel as if the action has been freely chosen (Haggard 
and Clark, 2003; Hallett, 2007; Kühn and Brass, 2009).
It has been hypothesized recently that the sense of volition is based 
on retrospective processes (Lau et al., 2007; Banks and Isham, 2009; 
Kühn and Brass, 2009). For instance, Lau et al. (2007) showed that 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the pre- supplementary 
motor area (pre-SMA) 200 ms after action execution, shifted the per-
ceived time of action closer to the response. Other studies reported 
that a large part of W is inferred retrospectively from the response 
(Banks and Isham, 2009; Kühn and Brass, 2009). In other words, 
the feeling of consciously intending to act would be infl uenced by 
events occurring after the supposed moment of decision. Going 
back to our decision to turn on the TV, this would mean that some 
events occurring just after the act of turning on the TV, for instance 
the button click, would have infl uenced our feeling of consciously 
and voluntarily deciding to turn on the TV.
Banks and Isham (2009) recently provided experimental dem-
onstration of this hypothesis, showing that the critical cue for judg-
ment of intention is the perception of the response, thus reversing 
the assumed causal relation between intention and action. They 
used a variant of the Libet’s task (Libet et al., 1983) in which they 
gave participants delayed-response feedback to create the illusion 
that their response was later than it actually was. If the perceived 
time of action is a prominent factor in judging the beginning of the 
intention, then a delay in the perceived time of the action would 
result in a delay in the reported time of W. They found that the 
reported Ws changed accordingly with the delayed feedback, mean-
ing that W is based largely on the apparent time of response and 
not on the motor response or other prior brain events.
In the present study, we wanted to address the issue of what 
neural mechanisms underlie the inferential process of the con-
scious intention by recording ERP while subjects are perform-
ing the variant of the Libet’s task developed by Banks and Isham 
(2009). If the feeling that we all have, of consciously causing an 
action, is inferred, at least partially, from something occurring after 
the action is produced by the subject (Lau et al., 2007; Banks and 
Isham, 2009; Kühn and Brass, 2009), there must be some neural 
events accounting for this retrospective timing of conscious inten-
tions. Although previous studies provided empirical demonstra-
tions that the timing of our conscious decisions is infl uenced by 
post-action brain processes (Lau et al., 2007), and is based on 
an inference rather than a perception (Banks and Isham, 2009), 
little is known about neural mechanisms actually driving this 
 reconstructive process.
Event-related potentials are a useful method to investigate the 
temporal profi le of neural processes underpinning cognitive func-
tions. This method has been utilized previously in the research on 
free will with the objective of identifying a relationship between the 
preparatory motor activity (i.e. the RP or the lateralized RP) and 
the estimated time people become conscious of their own inten-
tion to produce a response (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 
1999). For instance, Haggard and Eimer (1999) showed that the 
reported W correlates better with the late part of the RP, namely 
the lateralized RP, than with the RP, as originally reported by Libet 
et al. (1983). However, we investigated ERPs occurring after par-
ticipants produced a response using a variant of the Libet’s original 
task (Libet et al., 1983). Delayed auditory feedbacks were provided 
5, 20, 40 or 60 ms after participants’ response (i.e. a button press). 
If the time at which we become conscious of the intention to act, 
that is the W, is inferred largely by the apparent time of response 
(i.e. the auditory feedback), then we will fi nd ERP feedback-related 
components to change across delayed feedbacks.
Our specifi c hypothesis is that the reconstructive process of con-
scious decisions is modulated by the activity of an action-monitoring 
system that involves the medial frontal cortex (Oliveira et al., 2007; 
Band et al., 2009). Several studies support the idea that the brain has 
a specifi c mechanism for monitoring performance (Miltner et al., 
1997; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Oliveira 
et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009). Converging lines of evidence stress 
the role of the medial frontal cortex, and in particular the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), in action monitoring and in the evalua-
tion of behavioral performance (Miltner et al., 1997; Oliveira et al., 
2007; Band et al., 2009). It has been shown that the medial frontal 
cortex is involved in confl ict monitoring (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), 
error processing (Miltner et al., 1997) and reinforcement learning 
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002). For instance, the error-related negativ-
ity (ERN) and the feedback-related negativity (FRN) are elicited 
when participants commit an error or received a feedback worse 
than expected, respectively, and are thought to refl ect an increased 
activity of the ACC.
It has been suggested recently that both FRN and ERN would 
mirror the activity of a system that detects deviations from expect-
ancy rather than negative feedbacks or performance errors (Oliveira 
et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009). Consistent with the idea of a general 
system of action-monitoring, Oliveira et al. (2007) showed that 
the FRN is elicited when a feedback is different from the expected 
feedback, regardless of whether it is a positive or a negative one. 
In a different study, Band et al. (2009) showed that a negative wave 
peaking in the typical FRN time range was elicited by task-irrelevant 
action effects, that is, by action-contingent information that was not 
relevant for the task. These fi ndings support the idea of an action-
monitoring system that not only detects errors and negative feed-
backs, but that is sensitive to violations of expectancies. According 
to this expectancy-deviation hypothesis (Oliveira et al., 2007), the 
medial frontal cortex would act as a part of a general system that 
detects deviations from expectancy; the system compares people’s 
expected feedback to the actual feedback and is activated when a 
mismatch between the two is detected.
The expectancy-deviation hypothesis is in line with a more 
general theoretical framework of internal models (Wolpert and 
Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002). Specifi cally, the 
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 ‘forward model’ provides predictions of the sensory consequences 
of our own actions. Whenever such predictions are confi rmed by 
the afferent sensory information, or in other words, when there is 
no discrepancy between the model’s prediction and the actual sen-
sory consequences of the action, then there is no confl ict between 
sensory predictions and sensory consequences of our actions. On 
the contrary, if there is a mismatch between the model’s prediction 
and afferent sensory information, then a resolution of the confl ict 
would be required.
A number of studies have shown that people tend to modify their 
behavioral performance on the basis of false feedbacks, although 
they are unaware of the mismatch between the sensory predictions 
and the (false) sensory consequences of the action (Goodale et al., 
1994; Blakemore et al., 2002). Under this framework, the shift for-
ward of the reported W found by Banks and Isham (2009) would 
arise from the increased activity of the action-monitoring system, 
refl ecting the comparison between the model’s prediction (i.e. the 
auditory feedback is expected to be simultaneous to the button 
press) and the actual sensory consequences of the action (i.e. the 
auditory feedback is delayed relative to the button press). This, 
in turn, would result in a ‘resolution’ of the confl ict by adjust-
ing the perceived time of conscious decisions, as measured by the 
W judgment.
As mentioned above, it has been proposed that feedback- and 
performance-related negativities refl ect the activity of the medial 
frontal cortex and are elicited when the actual outcome of the per-
formance violates the predicted outcome (Oliveira et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, an action-effect negativity (N
AE
) is also elicited in 
case of task-irrelevant feedbacks that are only contingent with the 
motor action (Band et al., 2009). Here we tested the hypothesis 
that delayed feedbacks following voluntary movements would elicit 
larger N
AE
 as a function of an increase in the temporal mismatch 
between the actual and the perceived time of response. Our pre-
diction is that an increase in the mismatch between participants’ 
actual response and the delayed feedback would lead to increased 
activity in the action-monitoring system, resulting in larger N
AE
 for 
later delayed feedbacks as compared to earlier delayed feedbacks. In 
addition, we expected the activity of the action-monitoring system 
– refl ected by the N
AE
 – to result in a resolution of the confl ict by 
adjusting the timing of conscious decisions to move, thus shifting 
the reported W toward the apparent time of response indicated 
by the delayed auditory feedback. Therefore, if our hypothesis is 
correct, we should fi nd the amplitude of the N
AE
 being predictive 
of the changes in the reported Ws across delayed feedbacks.
Response-feedback not only evoke a negativity over fronto-
central areas in the 250 and 350 ms time range, but also a posi-
tive defl ection around 300–600 ms after stimulus onset (Overbeek 
et al., 2005; Waszak and Herwig, 2007; Band et al., 2009). This 
component, namely P3, is considered to consist of two mutually 
related components that may be elicited in tandem: the P3a has a 
fronto-central distribution, is elicited by deviant or novel stimuli 
and is considered to refl ect the orienting of attention; the P3b 
has a more posterior distribution and is elicited by infrequently 
occurring stimuli that are task-relevant, or involve a decision 
(Waszak and Herwig, 2007). In the current study, feedbacks sig-
naling the button press may elicit a positive waveform. Typically, 
however, P3 components have been investigated in tasks involving 
 deviant  stimuli that differed in terms of physical parameters and/or 
 probability of occurrence (Nittono, 2006; Waszak and Herwig, 
2007) and that involved a decision (Knight, 1996; Waszak and 
Herwig, 2007). On the contrary, in the current study the auditory 
feedbacks have equal physical parameters, duration, and prob-
ability of occurrence and were not related to any decision-making 
process. Furthermore, it has been proposed that early negative and 
late positive components refl ect two separate action-monitoring 
systems that differ in terms of the degree of awareness involved 
(Falkenstein et al., 1991; Kaiser et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2001; Overbeek et al., 2005). This idea is supported by empirical 
observations that the degree of awareness of an error covaries 
with the amplitude of the P3, but not with the amplitude of the 
preceding negative component (Kaiser et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2001). Consistent with these observations, Nieuwenhuis 
et al. (2001) suggested that the two components refl ect the activ-
ity of two distinct action-monitoring processes, of which only that 
refl ected by the P3 is associated with conscious error recognition. 
In the current study, we expected participants to be unaware of 
the temporal mismatch between the response and the delayed 
feedback. Therefore, we expected only the N
AE
 to be modulated 
by the experimental manipulation, whereas the P3 was expected 
to be insensitive to the experimental manipulation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen undergraduates (7 females, 9 males; age range 19–24 years) 
from the University of Padova volunteered for the present study. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
gave informed written consent and were debriefed at the end 
of the experiment. Participants were paid 8€ for taking part in 
the experiment.
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
The experiment followed the procedure used by Banks and Isham 
(2009) and is based on the method used by Libet et al. (1983). 
Participants sat in front of a computer screen. In each trial, a cur-
sor on the computer screen moved in a clockwise direction around 
a clock face, completing three revolutions in 8.1 s. The clock was 
90 mm in diameter with 60 evenly spaced spots. Presentation of 
the clock and recording of responses was controlled by E-Prime 
1.1 software.
Participants were requested to fi xate the center of the clock and 
to rest their right index fi nger on the response button, which was 
the keyboard spacebar. The participant’s hand was not visible to the 
participant. Participants were instructed to press the button spon-
taneously and suddenly at a time of their own choosing, following 
at least one rotation of the cursor. They were asked not to plan the 
time of the button press and were told that they could choose not 
to make a button press in any trial. Participants were explicitly told 
that an auditory feedback was delivered simultaneously with each 
button press. In fact, the computer emitted a 200-ms beep by a 
computer-generated random sequence at 5, 20, 40, or 60 ms right 
after the button press. After the button press the cursor rotated for 
a random interval between 800 and 1,500 ms and then stopped. 
Then, participants were asked to report the position of the cursor 
at the instant they made the decision to respond.
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Participants performed a practice session of 16 trials. Then, the 
experimental session started. There were 40 trials at each delay, 
for a total of 160 trials, administered in two separate blocks. Some 
trials did not yield data because participants chose not to respond 
(<1%). At the end of the experimental session, we asked partici-
pants whether they experienced a temporal mismatch between 
button press and the auditory feedback. None of the participants 
 acknowledged a temporal mismatch between the two events.
EEG RECORDING
Scalp voltages were recorded using a 59-channel electrocap with 
Ag/AgCL electrodes, arranged according to the 10–20 system. A 
frontal electrode (AFz) was connected to the ground. Mastoids 
served for reference and electrode impedance was kept under 
10 KΩ for all recordings. Vertical and horizontal ocular move-
ments were also recorded. Signals were amplifi ed and digitized 
with a Neuroscan system at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Off-line 
analyses were performed with Brain Vision Analyzer. The signal 
was off-line fi ltered (high pass 0.01 and low pass 30 Hz, 24 dB/
octave attenuation). Ocular movements’ artefacts were corrected 
using the algorithm provided by Brain Vision Analyzer (Gratton 
et al., 1983). Electrical recordings were segmented in epochs start-
ing 100 ms before the presentation of the auditory feedback and 
lasting until 900 ms after its onset. The epochs were aligned to the 
100 ms pre-stimulus baseline relative to the auditory feedback. 
Epochs affected by artefacts (±80 µV) were excluded from averag-
ing (rejected epochs ∼5%).
EMG RECORDING
The electromyographic signal (EMG) was recorded from the fl exor 
carpi radialis and nearby muscles by two electrodes pasted on the 
velar surface of the right forearm. The onset of the EMG was deter-
mined by an algorithm provided by Van Boxtel et al. (1993) fol-
lowed by a visual re-check of the EMG onset search procedure. 
EMG onset was measured as the fi rst point at which the EMG signal 
reached 3 standard deviations from the baseline.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
Trials with no responses provided by the participant, and with 
reported W exceeding ± 3 standard deviations from individual 
averages, were considered as errors and were discarded from the 
data analysis (∼2%). One participant showed a high rate of trials 
exceeding this criterion (>1/3) and was therefore excluded from 
further analyses. A repeated-measure ANOVA was performed 
with delay (5, 20, 40, and 60 ms) as within subjects’ factor and the 
reported W as dependent variable. We found a signifi cant effect of 
the delay factor (F(3,42) = 8.26, p = 0.004, η
p
2 = 0.37). The aver-
aged reported Ws at delays of 5, 20, 40, and 60 ms were −127, −111, 
−102, and −101 ms, respectively, relative to time of response (see 
Figure 1). The observed power was 0.88.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS
For the analyses, only trials in which participants provided a 
response were used. Figure 2A shows grand average ERPs following 
delayed auditory feedbacks in three different electrodes. We quanti-
fi ed N
AE 
amplitude in the averaged waveforms for each  participant 
as the base-to-peak difference between the average  voltage within 
260–300 ms after stimulus onset and the average voltage of the 
immediately preceding positive peak in the 180–220 ms time win-
dow. We used the average amplitude of the N
AE
 instead of peak 
amplitude because there were no clear maxima in the selected time 
range. We also measured P3 amplitude. The amplitude of the P3 
was quantifi ed as the most positive peak in the waveform in the 
300–400 ms period after stimulus onset, as compared to the 100 ms 
pre-stimulus baseline.
Component amplitudes were preliminarily entered into a 
repeated-measure ANOVA with electrode site (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz) 
as within subjects’ factor in order to identify scalp locations in which 
N
AE
 and P3 showed their maximum amplitude. The Greenhouse–
Geisser correction for violations of the assumption of sphericity 
was applied where appropriate. The analyses revealed a signifi cant 
effect of electrode site, both for the N
AE
 (F(4,56) = 13.61, p < 0.0001, 
η
p
2 = 0.49) and for the P3 (F(4,56) = 5.19, p = 0.001, η
p
2 = 0.27). 
N
AE 
showed a central scalp distribution, with a maximum over Cz, 
followed by FCz, CPz, Fz, and Pz. P3 was more pronounced over 
fronto-central electrodes, with a maximum over FCz, followed by 
Fz, Cz, CPz, and Pz.
Visual inspection of grand-averaged ERPs revealed a positive 
wave over fronto-central sites, namely the P200, occurring within 
150–250 ms time window after stimulus onset. In order to exclude 
that this early component was sensitive to the experimental manip-
ulation, we determined P200 amplitude through a base-to-peak 
procedure as the positive peak within 150–250 time window rela-
tive to the preceding negative peak in the 50–150 time window. A 
repeated-measure ANOVA was performed with feedback delay (5, 
20, 40, 60 ms) and electrode site (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz) as within 
subjects’ factors and the amplitude of the P200 as the dependent 
variable. The analysis showed a signifi cant effect of electrode site 
FIGURE 1 | Reported time of deciding to press a button (Ws) as a 
function of delay of response feedback after the button press (i.e. 5, 20, 
40, and 60 ms). The W is measured relative to the time of the button press.
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(F(4,56) = 7.81, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.36), with P200 being larger over 
FCz, followed by Fz, Cz, CPz, and Pz, but no effect of feedback delay 
(p = 0.77) and no interaction (p = 0.22).
To test our prediction that the N
AE
 would increase as a func-
tion of feedback delay, the N
AE 
amplitude over Cz was subjected 
to a repeated-measure ANOVA with the feedback delay (5, 20, 40, 
60 ms) as within subjects factor. The analysis yielded a signifi -
cant effect (F(3,42) = 3.42, p = 0.026, η
p
2 = 0.20), with larger N
AE
 
amplitude for more delayed feedbacks −2.87, −4.15, −4.22, and 
−5.06 µV for feedbacks delayed by 5, 20, 40 and 60 ms, respectively; 
see Figure 3). Figure 2B shows the topographical distribution map 
of the difference in the signal between the condition with the larger 
(i.e. 60 ms) and the smaller N
AE
 (i.e. 5 ms). This result confi rms 
our prediction that the N
AE
 is sensitive to the temporal mismatch 
between the actual response and the delayed auditory feedback. 
More delayed auditory feedbacks are associated with larger N
AE
 
amplitudes, suggesting that the amplitude of the N
AE
 increases as 
a function of the delay of the feedback. The linear component of 
the feedback delay effect was signifi cant (F(1,14) = 6.16, p = 0.026, 
η
p
2 = 0.31).
P3 amplitude over FCz was subjected to a repeated-measure 
ANOVA with the feedback delay (5, 20, 40, 60 ms) as within sub-
jects’ factor. The analysis yielded a marginal effect (F(3,42) = 2.65, 
p = 0.061), with smaller P3 amplitudes for more delayed feedbacks 
(6.36, 6.58, 5.65, and 4.63 µV for feedbacks delayed by 5, 20, 40 and 
60 ms, respectively).
NAE and reported W
Next, we performed a hierarchical multiple linear regression analy-
sis to test the prediction that the shift of the reported W toward 
the apparent time of response is associated with the increased 
amplitude of the NAE induced by the delay of the auditory feed-
back. The amplitude of N
AE
 for each participant and for each 
delayed feedback was entered at the fi rst block and the level of 
feedback delay (5, 20, 40 and 60 ms) was entered at the second 
block; reported Ws were the dependent variable. We found that 
the amplitude of the N
AE
 predicted the reported W signifi cantly 
(β = −0.32, t = −2.58, p = 0.012; F(1,58) = 6.66, R2 = 0.10). When 
the proportion of variance in the reported W explained by N
AE
 
amplitude was removed from the model, the feedback delay  factor 
FIGURE 2 | (A) Grand-averaged ERPs for the different delays of the auditory feedback at Fz, Cz, and Pz. The waveforms are time-locked to the delayed feedback 
onset, that is, represented in the fi gure by the vertical line. (B) Topographic difference in the NAE time range (260–300 ms) for 60–5 ms of feedback delay is displayed.
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failed to predict the change in the reported W (p = 0.44). This 
result strongly indicates that changes in the reported W are indeed 
associated with changes in the NAE amplitude, regardless of the 
delay of the feedback.
EMG DATA
The EMG onset was measured as the point of the fi rst steep increase 
in the EMG record in the 400 ms interval preceding the button 
press. The EMG preceded the button press by ∼99 ms, with little 
variability between delays (99, 100, 100, and 98 ms for the four 
delays, respectively). In order to assess whether the onset of the 
movement was related to the W, a linear regression analysis was 
performed with the EMG onset as predictor and the reported Ws 
as dependent variable. The analysis showed that the relationship 
is not signifi cant (p = 0.42), suggesting that the W is not related to 
the actual onset of the movement.
DISCUSSION
Recent findings showed that the subjective experience of 
conscious decisions is influenced by events occurring after a 
motor response is actually produced (Lau et al., 2007; Banks 
and Isham, 2009; Kühn and Brass, 2009). The feeling of causing 
an action consciously and deliberately seems to be, at least in 
part, based on a reconstructive process that depends largely on 
post-action events. Under this view, external cues related to the 
consequence of our actions, and compatible with our sensory 
prediction of the consequences of the action (Wolpert et al., 
1995), are processed by the brain and influence the feeling that 
we intended that action consciously and voluntarily. In these 
terms, it has been argued that the feeling that we have free 
will is, at least partially, dependent on an a posteriori recon-
struction (Lau et al., 2007; Banks and Isham, 2009; Kühn and 
Brass, 2009).
The aim of the present study was to investigate  psychophysiological 
mechanisms underlying the reconstructive process of conscious 
decisions. In order to do so, we recorded ERPs while participants 
were performing a variant of the classical Libet’s task (Banks and 
Isham, 2009). So far, ERP research on free will have focused on 
preparatory activity (i.e. RP or lateralized RP) occurring before an 
action was produced (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 1999). 
On the contrary, in the present study we focused on post-action 
brain events that may be related to the reported time of when a 
conscious decision to execute an action was made. In order to do 
so we asked participants to press a button at will and at the same 
time to monitor a red spot moving around a clock face. They were 
then asked to report the location of the spot when they had the fi rst 
intention to move. This measure is called the W judgment (Libet 
et al., 1983). Participants were also told that an auditory feedback, 
simultaneous to the button press, signaled that the response was 
provided. Indeed, unbeknown to the participants, the auditory 
feedback was not temporally overlapping the actual response, but 
could be delayed forward by 5, 20, 40, and 60 ms.
It has been suggested that people have an internal representa-
tion of the sensory consequences of their own actions (Wolpert 
and Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002) and that they use 
these internal representations to form predictions about the out-
come of behavior. Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000) suggest that two 
kinds of internal models lie behind these functions. The ‘forward 
model’ uses efference copy to predict the sensory consequences 
of motor commands whenever a movement is made. By contrast, 
the ‘inverse model’ provides motor commands that are necessary 
to achieve a desired outcome. An important aspect of the forward 
model is that it predicts the sensory consequences of movement 
and compares this with the actual feedback (Blakemore et al., 2002). 
This comparison occurs after a movement is made, and people are 
normally unaware of the actual state of the motor system and the 
actual sensory consequences of a movement. Furthermore, we are 
also unaware of the results of the comparison between the pre-
dicted and actual sensory feedback, as long as the desired state is 
achieved successfully. If the predictions made by the forward model 
are confi rmed by the afferent sensory information, then there is no 
discrepancy between the model’s prediction and the actual sensory 
consequences and, therefore, there is no confl ict between the sen-
sory predictions and the sensory consequences of the actions. On 
the contrary, a mismatch between the model’s prediction and affer-
ent sensory information would require a resolution of the confl ict 
(Goodale et al., 1994; Blakemore et al., 2002).
In line with the idea that people form internal representations of 
the consequences of the actions, the expectancy-deviation hypoth-
esis (Oliveira et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009) poses that feedback- and 
performance-related ERP components, such as the FRN and the 
ERN, refl ect the activity of the medial frontal cortex and are elicited 
when the actual outcome of the performance violates the predicted 
outcome (Oliveira et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009). In the present 
study, participants were told explicitly that the auditory feedback 
was delivered simultaneously with the button press. Therefore, we 
assumed that participants expected the sensory consequences of 
the action to be simultaneous with the button press. With this in 
mind, the auditory delayed feedbacks signaling the motor response 
later than it actually was, may be considered as a form of mismatch 
FIGURE 3 | Reported time of deciding to press a button (Ws) as a 
function of NAE amplitude at 5, 20, 40 and 60 ms of feedback delay. The 
reported Ws shift forward in time (i.e. closer to the actual response) for larger 
(i.e. more negative) NAE amplitudes.
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between the predictions of the sensory consequences and the actual 
sensory consequences of the action. Therefore, our fi rst hypoth-
esis was that the delay of the response feedback would result in 
an increased activity of the action-monitoring system (Oliveira 
et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009), refl ecting the comparison between 
the model’s prediction and the actual sensory consequences of 
the action.
At a behavioral level, we replicated the fi nding that the delay 
of the feedbacks did infl uence the reported W (see Figure 1). 
Participants shifted the reported time at which they had the inten-
tion to press the button (i.e. the W) forward in time, according 
with the delayed feedbacks. These results are in line with those 
obtained by Banks and Isham (2009) and are in accordance with 
the reconstructive hypothesis of the sense of free will (Aarts et al., 
2005; Lau et al., 2007; Banks and Isham, 2009; Kühn and Brass, 
2009). However, the feedback delay was not completely refl ected 
in the reported W. If the report of W was locked perfectly to the 
feedback, the slope relating W to delay of feedback would have been 
equal to 1. The slope of 0.46 suggests that constant cues unrelated 
to the tone affected the perception of response time. Indeed, it is 
not possible to exclude that somatosensory and tactile cues, as well 
as the effort at the beginning of the button press, may in fact have 
had an impact on the perceived time of response.
We found no relationship between the W and the actual onset of 
the movement as recorded by the EMG. This suggests that changes 
in the subjective timing of conscious decisions were not attribut-
able to changes in the actual onset of the movement, as measured 
by the EMG activity.
As regards ERP components, we found that the auditory feed-
backs following voluntary button presses elicited a negative wave 
in the 260–300 ms time range. We referred to this component as 
action-effect negativity (N
AE
), in accordance with a previous study 
by Band et al. (2009). Crucially, our experimental manipulation 
had a signifi cant effect on the N
AE.
 Its amplitude was maximal over 
fronto-central scalp locations and was enhanced as a function of the 
delay of the feedback signaling the time of response (see Figure 2). 
In other words, the longer the delay between the actual response and 
the auditory feedback, the greater the N
AE
 amplitude. This result 
supports our hypothesis that the activity of the action-monitor-
ing system, refl ected in the current study by the N
AE
, is enhanced 
when delayed feedbacks signal that the response was later than it 
actually was. Interestingly, although the N
AE
 was maximal over Cz, 
the topography of the difference between 60 and 5 ms of feedback 
delay (see Figure 2B) showed a lateralization over the controlateral 
fronto-central sites. We can speculate that this lateralization is due 
to the motor lateralization induced by response execution proc-
esses. It has been suggested that the propagation of the primary 
motor cortex activity towards premotor areas (Roger et al., 2010) 
may result in a lateralization of performance-related negativities 
following motor responses.
The relationship between the delay of the feedback and N
AE
 
amplitude may not be linear, as indicated by Figures 2 and 3 show-
ing that N
AE
 amplitudes with feedbacks delayed by 20 or 40 ms 
are almost overlapping. This suggests that other feedbacks from 
the environment, such as somatosensory and tactile cues, as well as 
the effort at the beginning of the button press, may be processed by 
the action-monitoring system and have an impact on the amplitude 
of the N
AE
. In other words, the N
AE
, as well as the reported W, may 
refl ect the integration of several action-related feedbacks – not just 
the effect of the delayed auditory feedback.
The auditory feedback also evoked a positive component, namely 
the P3, peaking at around 360 ms after stimulus onset. A number of 
studies showed that P3 amplitude is involved in the performance-
monitoring process (see Overbeek et al., 2005 for a review); this 
component is typically larger for stimuli that deviate from expec-
tations, such as errors or unexpected feedbacks. The lack of effect 
on the P300 amplitude strengthens the point the participants were 
unaware of the feedback delay, given that this component is sensi-
tive to stimulus awareness (Overbeek et al., 2005). Unexpectedly, 
we found P3 amplitude being smaller for more delayed feedbacks 
– and thus more deviating from the predictions of the sensory 
consequences – as compared with less delayed feedbacks. However, 
the effect was not signifi cant; it seems likely that the variability in 
the preceding N
AE
 contributed to the marginal effect found for the 
P3 amplitude.
A second hypothesis was that the activity of the action-
 monitoring system, refl ected by the N
AE
, is involved in the recon-
structive process of conscious decisions. This prediction was based 
on previous studies showing that when there is a confl ict between 
the predictions of the sensory consequences and the actual sensory 
consequences of an executed voluntary action, individuals tend to 
adjust their behavioral performance in order to reduce the confl ict 
(Goodale et al., 1994; Blakemore et al., 1999). In the current study, 
we used a Libet task (Libet et al., 1983; Banks and Isham, 2009) and 
asked participants to report the time (i.e. W) of the conscious deci-
sion of a voluntary button press. If the hypothesis that the action-
monitoring system is involved in the timing of conscious decisions 
is correct, we would expect the reported W to be linked to the 
increased activity of the action-monitoring system, here refl ected 
by the N
AE
. We found that the amplitude of the N
AE
 predicted the 
reported W signifi cantly, with increased N
AE
 amplitudes resulting in 
reported Ws closer to the button press. Crucially, when controlled 
for N
AE
 amplitude, the feedback delay factor failed to predict the 
reported W, indicating that changes in the reported W are indeed 
associated with changes in the amplitude of the N
AE
, and not just 
to the delay of the auditory feedback. This result is consistent with 
our hypothesis that the activity of the action-monitoring system, 
refl ected in the current study by the amplitude of the N
AE
, plays 
a role in the reconstructive process of our conscious decisions, as 
measured by the W judgment.
A remaining question is how the N
AE
 obtained in the current 
study should be classifi ed with regard to the fronto-central negativi-
ties peaking around 250 ms (see Folstein and Van Petten, 2008 for a 
review). For instance, the mismatch negativity (MMN; Näätänen and 
Alho, 1997) is a negative-going component that follows deviant audi-
tory stimuli. However, it is only elicited when there is a substantial 
difference between the overall probability of a standard and a deviant 
auditory stimulus, whereas in the current study the delayed auditory 
feedbacks have an equal probability of 0.25. Another N2 compo-
nent, namely the control-related N2, is elicited by stimuli inducing 
response confl ict and/or requiring response inhibition (Folstein and 
Van Petten, 2008). In the current study, it is unlikely that the delayed 
auditory feedbacks induced response confl ict or response inhibition, 
since the response was already executed before the presentation of the 
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and the awareness of voluntary move-
ments. Exp. Brain Res. 126, 128–133.
Hallett, M. (2007). Volitional control of 
movement: the physiology of free will. 
Clin. Neurophysiol. 118, 1179–1192.
Haynes, J., Sakai, K., Rees, G., Gilbert, S., 
Frith, C., and Passingham, R. (2007). 
Reading hidden intentions in the 
human brain. Curr. Biol. 17, 323–328.
Holroyd, C. B., and Coles, M. G. H. 
(2002). The neural basis of human 
error processing: reinforcement 
learning, dopamine, and the error-
related  negativity. Psychol. Rev. 109, 
679–709.
Kaiser, J., Barker, R., Haenschel, C., 
Baldeweg, T., and Gruzelier, J. H. 
(1997). Hypnosis and event-related 
potential correlates of error processing 
decisions is at least partially based on a reconstructive process 
(Banks and Isham, 2009; Kühn and Brass, 2009). Our participants 
were unaware of the delay, and this provides further evidence 
that the comparison between the intended sensory consequences 
and the actual sensory consequences is unavailable to awareness 
(Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002). Under 
this view, the shift in the W judgment may be the result of a sort 
of expectancy violation related to the predicted sensory feedback 
of our action. The fact that participants were unaware of the 
delay suggests that the action-monitoring system operates at an 
implicit level and this is in line with previous data showing that 
people are unaware of the mismatch, even with longer delays 
between the predicted and the actual sensory consequence of 
the action (Blakemore et al., 1999). Nevertheless, it is possible 
that such an implicit monitoring system has a kind of temporal 
threshold after which feedback is not considered as belonging to 
the action anymore. However, this idea is very speculative and 
would need further investigation.
Our interpretation of the result, is that the temporal mismatch 
between the predicted and the actual sensory feedback was detected 
by the action-monitoring system (Oliveira et al., 2007; Band et al., 
2009), as refl ected by the N
AE
 amplitude, and caused a shift in the 
subjective timing of when the action was decided. To our knowledge, 
this is the fi rst study employing ERPs recording for investigating 
psychophysiological mechanisms underlying reconstructive proc-
esses of conscious decision. Changes in the reported W were related 
to what we called N
AE
, a negative potential involved in response and 
feedback- and action-monitoring (Oliveira et al., 2007; Folstein 
and Van Petten, 2008; Band et al., 2009). Taken together these 
fi ndings indicate that the reported time of conscious decisions are 
infl uenced strongly by the consequences of our actions, that are 
constantly monitored by a dedicated system involving the medial 
frontal cortex.
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auditory stimulus. Regardless of the exact classifi cation of the N
AE
, 
however, this study supports the idea of a system that detects devia-
tion from expectancies (Oliveira et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009).
To summarize we showed that reported time of decisions was 
predictable on the basis of the amplitude of a negative component 
related to the action-effects (Band et al., 2009), occurring 260–300 ms 
after the presentation of an auditory feedback. These results suggest 
that when people are asked to report when they made the decision to 
execute an action, they are strongly infl uenced by the consequences 
of the action. Furthermore, we showed that this retrospective proc-
ess relies on the activity of an action-monitoring system that, it has 
been argued, involves the medial frontal cortex (Miltner et al., 1997; 
Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Oliveira et al., 2007; Band et al., 2009).
CURRENT FINDINGS AND THE LIBET PARADIGM
There is an extensive debate on the question as to what extent results 
from this kind of experiment have implications for our understand-
ing of volition and intent (Hallett, 2007; Pocket and Miller, 2007). Our 
results indicate that if asked to report when they decided to execute 
an action, people rely – presumably at an implicit level – on the per-
ceived sensory consequences of the action. With respect to the free 
will debate, these fi ndings support the idea that the Libet paradigm 
may not be the best approach to investigate conscious intentions of 
motor actions. It is not possible to exclude that people use systematic 
strategies in this task, either consciously or in an automatic manner, 
to judge the time of conscious decisions. For instance, they might 
remember the position of the clock at the time of the feedback (e.g. 
the auditory tone and/or somatosensory and tactile feedbacks), and 
then infer that the decision ‘must’ have taken place somewhere before. 
In any case, if people infer, at least partially, the time they decided 
to act from the consequences of the action (e.g. a tone signaling the 
response), then the reported W used in the Libet paradigm may not 
be a reliable measure for the investigation of when a decision to act 
enters subjective awareness (for a review on limitations of the Libet 
paradigm refer to Pockett and Miller, 2007).
CONCLUSION
In the present work, a small disruption of the temporal parameter 
of an auditory feedback, caused people to shift forward in time 
the W judgment, suggesting that the timing of our conscious 
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